Howell v. New York Post: Patient Rights versus the Press by Lee, Padraic D.
Pace Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 2 Winter 1995 Article 3
January 1995
Howell v. New York Post: Patient Rights versus the
Press
Padraic D. Lee
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Padraic D. Lee, Howell v. New York Post: Patient Rights versus the Press, 15 Pace L. Rev. 459 (1995)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/3
Howell v. New York Post:
Patient Rights versus the Press
Padraic D. Lee, Esq.*
I. Introduction
Howell v. New York Post' was a case of first impression
where the New York State Court of Appeals considered the rela-
tionship between two separate but potentially overlapping bod-
ies of law: infliction of emotional distress and invasion of
privacy.2 By a unanimous decision, New York State's highest
court held that a "real relationship" between an individual pho-
tographed and a news article would defeat any statutory pri-
vacy claim.3 The court held that conduct otherwise found to be
extreme and outrageous might yet be privileged, "meaning that
defendants acted within their legal rights," under certain cir-
cumstances such as newspaper publication. 4
The Court of Appeals warned that an individual might still
"defeat the privilege and state a claim for emotional distress,"
given the right set of facts. 5 The court explicitly validated reck-
less infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action in New
* B.S., Fordham University, Bronx, N.Y.; J.D., Pace University School of Law,
White Plains, N.Y.; Associate, Clark, Gagliardi and Miller, P.C., White Plains,
N.Y. The author served as counsel for the appellant in Howell v. New York Post,
181 A.D.2d 597, 581 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1st Dep't 1992), aff'd, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612
N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993).
1. 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993).
2. Id. at 118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
3. Id. at 124, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355. The court explained its
reluctance "to intrude upon reasonable editorial judgments in determining
whether there is a real relationship between an article and a photograph." Id.
(citing Finger v. Omni Publications Intl, Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 143, 566 N.E.2d 141,
144, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (1990)); see also Gaeta v. New York News, 62 N.Y.2d
340, 349, 465 N.E.2d 802, 805, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (1984). Then, seemingly sua
sponte, the court expanded the definition of "real relationship" to include anything
that would affect the "visual impact" of the photograph. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 125,
612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355. Now editors essentially have full author-
ity to define real relationship. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
4. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.




York State6 and implicitly qualified the media's privilege by
stating that the publication of unauthorized photographs "with-
out more - could not ordinarily lead to liability for infliction of
emotional distress."7
This Article discusses both the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress and of invasion of privacy under New York
law in relation to patients' rights. Part II provides background
on the tort of infliction of emotional distress (intentional and
reckless) and the statutory provisions regarding invasion of pri-
vacy. Particular attention is paid to the requirements for liabil-
ity pursuant to established case law and treatise opinion. Part
II also examines relevant public health laws and historical leg-
islative intent aimed at protecting the rights of psychiatric
patients.
Part III discusses the facts, procedural history and the deci-
sions in Howell v. New York Post. Part IV analyzes the opinion
of the New York Court of Appeals, with particular focus on the
court's grudging but ultimate recognition that liability may at-
tach for infliction of emotional distress pursuant to the manner
in which the press gathers and publishes the news, provided the
"rigorous requirements" of the tort are met.8
This Article concludes that the decision in Howell fails to
provide adequate protection to New York State psychiatric pa-
tients (and patients in general) by allowing media entities to
use their right of free press to publish photographs of patients
undergoing treatment, without consent and against medical
warning. The Howell decision obliterates a fundamental pa-
tient right - the right to undergo psychiatric/medical treat-
ment in a dignified, confidential and non-threatening
environment.
6. Id. at 121, 612 N.E.2d at 702, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
7. Id. at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356; see also infra notes 26-





A. Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Court of Appeals described the tort of infliction of emo-
tional distress as a tort with a "long history."9 Initially, the
court recalled the historical aversion to recognizing any claim
for emotional distress even where, as in a nineteenth century
case, for example, a woman suffered a "miscarriage" after being
frightened by a defendant's horses.' 0 Although emotional dis-
tress damages were allowed "as an adjunct, or 'parasitic'" to
recognized torts,1 New York common law did not recognize
emotional injury as a valid independent basis for recovery, even
if there were attendant "physical manifestations."12 Indeed, the
First Restatement of Torts essentially insulated an actor from
liability for conduct which caused only emotional distress.'3
The concerns about such claims were the same then as now.
Essentially, courts feared a flood of litigation and the ability of
potential plaintiffs to "feign" emotional distress. 14
Despite this attitude against emotional distress claims
standing on their own, courts did allow damages for such injury
if they accompanied traditional causes of action such as defama-
9. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 119, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
10. Id. at 119-20, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (citing Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896)). In Mitchell, the plaintiff was
standing on a crosswalk waiting to board defendant's car when the car's team of
horses was driven to come "so close to the plaintiff that she stood between the
horses' heads when they stopped." Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 108, 45 N.E. at 354. The
court held that the "plaintiff cannot recover for injuries occasioned by fright, as
there was no immediate personal injury." Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
11. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 120, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (citing
Garrison v. Sun Print & Publishing Ass'n, 207 N.Y. 1, 6-7, 100 N.E. 430, 431
(1912)). The court in Garrison held that in an action to recover for defamatory
words, damages for mental distress are recoverable if "physical sufferings" attend
such distress. Garrison, 207 N.Y. at 6-7, 100 N.E. at 431.
12. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 119, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 252 (citing
Mitchell).
13. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 120, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352. The
court noted that "conduct which is intended or which though not so intended is
likely to cause only a mental or emotional disturbance to another does not subject
the actor to liability . . . for emotional distress resulting therefrom." Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (1934)).
14. Id. at 120, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (citing Mitchell, 151
N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55).
3
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tion, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction. 15 Ear-
lier "courts often struggled to find an established cause of action
upon which to base an award of emotional distress damages to a
deserving plaintiff."16
By the mid-twentieth century, however, the law was clearly
changing. Legal scholars like Dean Prosser were making
pointed and reasonable arguments to legitimize emotional dis-
tress claims.' 7 Eventually, the Second Restatement of Torts
embraced these new concepts and coalesced these emerging
principles into a clear declaration that "[one who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes se-
vere emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress .... "18
Prior to 1993, the New York Court of Appeals had adopted
the rule set out in the Second Restatement of Torts, which de-
lineates reckless infliction of emotional distress as a viable
cause of action.' 9 The comments to the Second Restatement de-
tail the burden of proof for reckless conduct as that conduct
15. Id. (citing Garrison v. Sun Print & Publishing Ass'n, 207 N.Y. 1, 100 N.E.
430 (1912)); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12, at 56-57 & n.18-20 (5th ed. 1984).
16. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 120, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352; see also
Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel, 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920); Aaron v. Ward,
203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736 (1911).
17. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 120-21, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). The RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS 1948 amendment at § 46 was the forerunner of the final Restate-
ment section.
19. See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 480 N.E.2d 349, 490
N.Y.S.2d 735 (1985); Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402
N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978). In Freihofer, defendant newspaper accessed court files of a
matrimonial proceeding involving the plaintiff, a wealthy and well-known business
man, in order to publish a series of articles. Id. at 137-38, 480 N.E.2d at 351, 490
N.Y.S.2d at 737. The Court of Appeals applied the recklessness rule of the Second
Restatement. Id. at 143, 480 N.E.2d at 355, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 741; see also Murphy
v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (1983) ("[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff's allegations
must satisfy the rule set out in the Restatement of Torts, Second, which we
adopted in Fischer v. Maloney. .. ."). In Howell, the Court of Appeals has explic-
itly stated that reckless conduct, as opposed to intentional conduct, can be one of
the four elements necessary to bring a claim for emotional distress. Howell, 81
N.Y.2d at 121, 612 N.E.2d at 702, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 353. Specifically the court
stated that "[tihe tort has four elements:... (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a





which is "in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability
that the emotional distress will follow."20 In addition, Profes-
sors Prosser and Keeton pointed out that the conscious disre-
gard of a considerable probability of mental distress has formed
the basis for pleading reckless infliction of emotional distress.21
One "basis on which extreme outrage can be found is the
defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff is especially sensitive,
susceptible and vulnerable to injury through mental distress at
the particular conduct."22 The Second Restatement reasons
that "[t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct
may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is pecu-
liarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physi-
cal or mental condition or peculiarity." 3
The Second Restatement details the elements of the tort of
infliction of emotional distress as follows: "(i) extreme and out-
rageous conduct; (ii) intent to cause, or a disregard of a substan-
tial probability of causing, emotional distress; (iii) a causal
connection; and (iv) severe emotional distress."24
It is well established that liability will only be found where
the conduct is so outrageous that it goes beyond all possible
bounds of decency. 25 Although no court (including the Court of
Appeals)26 has specifically delineated this conduct, the Restate-
ment defines it as "intolerable in a civilized community." 27
Prosser and Keeton note cases ranging from cruel practical
jokes and rumors,2 to the more egregious conduct of prolonged
and indecent solicitation of a woman. 29
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. i (1965); see also id. cmt. a.
21. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 12, at 64.
22. Id. at 62.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965).
24. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 121, 612 N.E.2d at 702, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 353 (con-
struing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965)).
25. See Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 303, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.2d at 236 (hold-
ing that the defendant's termination of plaintiff's employment was not conduct
that could be described as outrageous according to the Restatement).
26. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d ("Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' ").
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 12, at 60-61.




Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co. 30 was one of the early
New York cases that considered a claim for emotional distress
as an independent cause of action.31 In Mitchell, a claim was
brought by the plaintiff, a pregnant woman, for emotional dis-
tress as a result of being frightened by the defendant's horses. 32
The court, however, denied a remedy for shock or fright stem-
ming from the defendant's negligent conduct. 33 As is true today,
the court feared a flood of litigation and the potential for false
claims. 34 Battalla v. State,3 5 however, overruled Mitchell and
allowed recovery for mental or emotional injuries incurred by
fright caused by a defendant's negligence. 36
A review of New York case law indicates that some claims
of emotional distress have prevailed against dismissal motions.
In Sullivan v. Board of Education of Eastchester Union Free
School District,37 the court noted that spreading false rumors
about and alleged improper treatment of a tenured instructor
was sufficiently outrageous conduct to allow a remedy. 38 In
Prince v. Gurvitz,39 the court held that merely threatening
someone with "criminal prosecution," in an attempt to coerce
that individual into transferring certain stock, was legally suffi-
cient to impose liability.40
Notwithstanding, the media usually prevails against
claims of emotional distress, invariably because the conduct
complained of is not deemed outrageous enough. For example,
in Doe v. American Broadcasting,41 the defendant news station
was reporting on rape victims. 42 The station assured the plain-
tiff rape victims' anonymity in exchange for consent to pub-
30. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 108-09, 45 N.E. at 354.
33. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
34. Id.
35. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
36. Id. The Battalla court opined: "It is our opinion that Mitchell should be
overruled. It is undisputed that a rigorous application of its rule would be unjust,
as well as opposed to experience and logic." Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219
N.Y.S.2d at 35.
37. 131 A.D.2d 836, 517 N.Y.S.2d 197 (2d Dep't 1987).
38. Id. at 839, 45 N.E. at 200.
39. 37 A.D.2d 727, 323 N.Y.S.2d 861 (2d Dep't 1971).
40. Id. at 727-28, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
41. 152 A.D.2d 482, 543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1st Dep't 1989).
42. Id. at 483, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
464 [Vol. 15:459
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lish.43  The media entity had rightfully conducted the
consensual interviews, and at least tried to conceal the victims'
identities upon broadcast." But the techniques used by the
news station failed to adequately conceal the plaintiffs' identity,
and they were recognized by others.45 Subsequent actions for
emotional distress were unsuccessful.4 In short, the media's
negligence, consisting essentially of a technical error, was not
deemed outrageous under the circumstances.47
Likewise, in Costlow v. Cusimano,48 the defendant photog-
rapher "arrived at the scene" of a horrific event and photo-
graphed two children found suffocated in an abandoned
refrigerator. 49 The distraught parents of the children brought
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 50 The
actions of the media were not deemed outrageous under the cir-
cumstances. 51 The court reasoned that reporting of the tragedy
was of public interest, and warned other parents of such dan-
gers. 52 In addition, as in Doe, the reporter was rightfully pres-
ent at the scene.5 3
Even in three of the leading cases on emotional distress,
Fischer v. Maloney,54 Murphy v. American Home Products






48. 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (4th Dep't 1970).
49. Id. at 197, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
50. Id. at 198, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
51. Id. at 198, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978). In Fischer, a
tenant and shareholder in a cooperative corporation alleged that the Board of Di-
rectors commenced a defamation action against him frivolously and in retaliation
for his attempt to remove the Board from office. Id. at 556, 373 N.E.2d at 1216,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The tenant/shareholder brought an action against the Board
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. The court held that the Board's
action against the plaintiff did "not constitute conduct within the Rule described by
Dean Prosser and the Restatement." Id. at 557, 373 N.E.2d at 1217, 402 N.Y.S.2d
at 993.
55. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). In Murphy, the
plaintiff was employed, without contract ("at will"), at various accounting positions
for over twenty years. Id. at 293, 448 N.E.2d at 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The court
7
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meet their respective burdens of proof regarding the "outra-
geous conduct" requirement. Fischer, however, dealt merely
with a claim of "vexatious" litigation.57 In Murphy, the plaintiff
complained of age discrimination and wrongful discharge from
employment carried out in a "humiliating manner."58 In Frei-
hofer, as well, the claim was ultimately denied.59 In that case, a
media entity published three articles about alleged "marital dif-
ficulties" between the plaintiff and his wife.60 The plaintiff,
however, was a principal of a well known baking company.61
One of the articles was entitled "Freihofers Fighting Over the
Dough."62 This kind of publication was simply not deemed out-
rageous beyond all bounds of decency.63
Aside from determining whether a defendant's conduct is
outrageous, however, a court must also determine the inten-
tional or reckless nature of the conduct. Indeed, one of the rea-
sons the court ruled favorably for the defendant in Costlow was
that it felt the defendant had not acted with intent to harm but
was reporting on an issue of grave public concern.6 As detailed
above, the Court of Appeals has adopted the rule set out in the
Second Restatement, which specifically allows for liability to at-
tach to "[olne who by extreme and outrageous conduct inten-
tionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another ... "65
found that the plaintiff's discharge at age 59 was not outrageous conduct. Id. at
303, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
56. 65 N.Y.2d 135, 480 N.E.2d 349, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1985).
57. Fischer, 43 N.Y.2d at 555, 373 N.E.2d at 1216, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
58. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 298, 448 N.E.2d at 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
59. Freihofer, 65 N.Y.2d at 143-47, 480 N.E.2d at 355, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
60. Id. at 137, 480 N.E.2d at 351, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 143-44, 480 N.E.2d at 355, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 741. See also Burlew v.
American Mut. Ins., 99 A.D.2d 11, 471 N.Y.S.2d 908 (4th Dep't 1984). The plaintiff
in Burlew was injured at work and received Worker's Compensation benefits. Id.
at 12, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 910. When follow-up surgery was necessary, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant insurance company delayed coverage and implied the
plaintiff was a malingerer. Id. When the plaintiff sued the insurance company for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, again, such conduct was not deemed
outrageous. Id. at 16-17, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
64. Costlow, 34 A.D.2d at 198, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
466 [Vol. 15:459
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Although the Post argued that case law of the Appellate Di-
vision, First Department required a pattern of intentional and
malicious conduct before liability could attach for infliction of
emotional distress, 66 no such theory was in any way adopted by
the Court of Appeals, nor has it been adopted by the remaining
Departments.67 Indeed, it would be illogical to do so. If the
Court of Appeals has recognized causes of action for both inten-
tional and reckless infliction of emotional distress, how could a
pattern of intentional conduct be "required" as a basis for
both?68 Finally, as in any tort, there must be causation of in-
jury. Emotional distress claims not associated with negligence
(i.e., zone of danger),69 can often have difficulty with this partic-
ular element of proof.
66. See Nader v. General Motors, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970). In Nader, the First Department stated that a remedy for
mental anguish is available to redress "a deliberate and malicious campaign of
harassment or intimidation." Id. at 569, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654;
see also Owen v. Leventritt, 174 A.D.2d 471, 571 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't 1991). In
Owen the First Department, citing Nader and Doe v. American Broadcasting, 152
A.D.2d 482, 543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1st Dep't 1989), again stated that "[a] person may
recover 'only where severe mental pain or anguish is inflicted through a deliberate
and malicious campaign of harassment or intimidation.'" Id. at 472, 571 N.Y.S.2d
at 25. The Doe court cited Nader and reasoned that a claim for emotional distress
required "intentional, deliberate and outrageous" conduct. Doe, 152 A.D.2d at 483,
543 N.Y.S.2d at 456; but see Gordon v. Roche Laboratories, 90 A.D.2d 722, 455
N.Y.S.2d 785 (1st Dep't 1982). In Gordon, the First Department stated that the
elements required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress "are
extreme and outrageous conduct which intentionally or recklessly causes emotional
distress to another." Id. at 722, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
67. See Richard L. v. Armon, 144 A.D.2d 1, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1989).
InArmon, the Second Department stated that the second element of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim "is that the defendant be proved to have in-
tended to cause emotional distress, or to have acted with conscious disregard of a
substantial risk that such distress would result from his conduct...." Id. at 5, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 1016; Impastato v. Hellman Enterprises, 147 A.D.2d 788, 537
N.Y.S.2d 659 (3d Dep't 1989) (stating that recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress required either intentional or reckless conduct); Burlew v.
American Mut. Ins., 99 A.D.2d 11, 471 N.Y.S.2d 908 (4th Dep't 1984). The Fourth
Department, in Burlew, stated "[a]n action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress lies only where there has been intentional or reckless conduct toward an-
other which is so shocking and outrageous that it exceeds all reasonable bounds of
decency...." Id. at 17, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
68. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 4-5, Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d
115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993) (No. 43723/89) [hereinafter Reply
Brief].
69. See generally Jensen v. Whitford, 167 A.D.2d 826, 562 N.Y.S.2d 317 (4th
Dep't 1990). The court in Jensen held that individuals must be in reasonable fear
9
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B. The Right to Privacy
Sections 50 and 51 of the New York State Civil Rights Law
outline the statutory right to privacy.70 In New York, there is
no common law right to privacy.71 The civil statute, section 51,
allows for liability to attach if a person's "name, portrait or pic-
ture" is used for trade or advertising purposes without prior
"written consent."72 This statute grew out of Roberson v. Roch-
ester Folding Box Co., 7s where a young woman's likeness was
appropriated, without consent of any kind, for use in the adver-
tisement of flour. 74 The New York State Court of Appeals, while
recognizing the serious nature of the defendant's conduct, still
allowed no remedy, since it did not find the photograph at issue
"libelous."75 There was such an outcry about this harsh decision
for their own safety before they can bring an action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress due to witnessing the injury of an immediate family member. Id. at
826, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 318. See also Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d
843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1983), where the court held:
The zone of danger rule, which allows one who is himself or herself
threatened with bodily harm in consequence of the defendant's negligence to
recover for emotional distress resulting from viewing the death or serious
physical injury of a member of his or her immediate family, is said to have
become the majority rule in this country.
Id. at 228-29, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 361; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 436(2), (3) (1965).
70. N.Y. Civ. RIGIHrs LAw §§ 50 & 51 (McKinney 1992).
71. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 123, 612 N.E.2d at 703, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
72. Id.; see also Finger v. Omni Publications Intl Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 566
N.E.2d 141, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1990). In Finger, the plaintiff was pictured in a
photograph with his wife and six children. Id. at 141, 566 N.E.2d at 142, 564
N.Y.S.2d at 1015. The photograph was used by the defendant in an article about
in vitro fertilization, even though none of the plaintiff's children were produced by
such methods. Id. at 140-42, 566 N.E.2d at 142-44, 56 N.Y.S.2d at 1015-17. When
the plaintiff brought an action for invasion of privacy, the court referenced section
51 and stated that "[allthough the statute does not define 'purposes of trade' or
'advertising,' courts have consistently refused to construe these terms as encom-
passing publications concerning newsworthy events-or matters of public interest
.... " Id. at 141-42, 566 N.E.2d at 143,564 N.Y.S.2d at 1016. The court found that
the photograph in question bore a real relationship to a newsworthy article and so
the failure to obtain consent was not a violation. Id. at 143, 566 N.E.2d at 144, 564
N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
73. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
74. Id. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442. Approximately 25,000 lithographic screen
prints of the plaintiff in Roberson were distributed as part of an advertisement to
sell flour. Id.
75. Id. at 556-57, 64 N.E. at 447-48. In an interesting dissent, Justice Gray
noted" 'that courts have power, in some cases, to enjoin the doing of an act, where
468
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the Legislature enacted the privacy statutes. 76
The use of one's name or likeness in the publication and
sale of newspapers is considered a First Amendment right of
"free press" and not "trade," provided there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the individual and the newsworthy issue.
77
However, where a photo is used as an "advertisement in dis-
guise"78 or to just enhance the sales of a periodical, that use may
be considered a commercial one for the purpose of trade.
7 9
It is clear that the unmistakable intent of the privacy stat-
ute is to protect the property right of an individual's likeness
from commercial exploitation. 80 These statutes were not en-
acted as a preemptive remedy voiding all other forms of redress
for tortious conduct; courts have reasoned that liability could
the nature, or character, of the act itself is well calculated to wound the sensibili-
ties of an individual, and where the doing of the act is wholly unjustifiable ....'"
Id. at 559-60, 64 N.E. at 449 (Gray, J., dissenting) (quoting Schuyler v. Curtis, 147
N.Y. 434, 443, 42 N.E. 22, 24 (1895)). This dissent seems to have been yet another
herald of the change in the law as eventually codified in the Second Restatement.
76. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 122-23, 612 N.E.2d at 703, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
77. Delan v. CBS, 91 A.D.2d 255, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1983); Wallace v.
Weiss, 82 Misc. 2d .1053, 372 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1975); Lahiri
v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S. 382 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1936).
78. Murray v. New York Magazine, 27 N.Y.2d 406, 409, 267 N.E.2d 256, 258,
318 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (1971). In Murray, the defendant newspaper took a photo-
graph of the plaintiff wearing an "Irish" hat, green bow tie and pin at the St. Pat-
rick's Day Parade in New York City. Id. at 408, 267 N.E.2d at 257, 318 N.Y.S.2d at
475. The photograph was used in an article entitled "The Last of the Irish Immi-
grants." Id. The plaintiff brought an action against the newspaper under section
51. Id. The Court held for the defendant stating that the photograph related to
the article and was used in a news publication, not for trade so that the privacy
statute did not apply. Id. at 409-10, 267 N.E.2d at 258, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
79. Delan, 91 A.D.2d at 258, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 613. In Delan, a documentary
was being made about the deinstitutionalization of mental patients. Id. at 256-57,
458 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12. The media did obtain written informed consent from the
subjects of the interview but the plaintiff, from whom consent was not obtained,
was accidentally pictured for a few seconds in this sixty minute documentary. Id.
The Delan court defined advertising purposes as "use in, or as part of, an adver-
tisement or solicitation for patronage." Id. at 258, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 613. See also
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Pagan v. New York Herald
Tribune, 32 A.D.2d 341, 301 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 1969); Hill v. Hayes, 18
A.D.2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963); Rinaldi v. Village Voice, 79 Misc. 2d
57, 359 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
80. See Gautier v. Pro-Football, 278 A.D. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1st Dep't
1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d
329, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957). The Cardy court found that
"the statute was obviously aimed at exploitation for purposes of commerce." Id. at
331-32, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
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attach for the media's tortious conduct independent of any sec-
tion 51 claim.8 '
The concept of free press and the right to report on news-
worthy issues form the basis for any claim of privileged con-
duct.8 2 To date, the issue of "free press" has come into play
more with issues of privacy than with emotional distress.8 3
Since media "publications concerning newsworthy events or
matters of public interest" are not considered to be made for
purposes of "advertisement or trade,"8 4 the practical result is
that the press, essentially, is not subject to the state's only pri-
vacy statutes.8 5
Notwithstanding, this privilege or right to publish may still
be overcome by facts found to be "outrageous."8 6 The Court of
Appeals has reasoned that the media's right to free press is not
absolute and, on the right facts, liability may attach specifically
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 7
As a result, the press must meet a minimal standard of ac-
ceptable conduct, even when reporting on subjects of legitimate
public concern. 88 The media may not act in an irresponsible
manner, nor commit torts while gathering or publishing the
news and then use their right to publish as a shield, or worse, a
license. 9 As the First Department has held, "[c]learly, the First
81. Vogel v. Hearst Corp., 116 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1952).
The Vogel court held that "apart from these statutes there is no so-called 'right of
privacy' except in so far as invasion of a person's privacy involves other tortious
acts .... " Id. at 906; see also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. See generally Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474
N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984); Arrington v. New York Times, 55 N.Y.2d
433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983);
Murray v. New York Magazine, 27 N.Y.2d 406, 267 N.E.2d 256, 318 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1971); Creel v. Crown Publishers, 115 A.D.2d 414, 496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't
1985); Delan v. CBS, 91 A.D.2d 255, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1983).
83. See generally Finger v. Omni Publications Intl Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 566
N.E.2d 141, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1990).
84. Id. at 141-42, 566 N.E.2d at 143, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
85. This makes it even more important that redress through torts like inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress be available to plaintiffs as a check on media
activities.
86. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
87. Id.
88. Gaeta v. New York News, 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802,477 N.Y.S.2d 82
(1984); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).




Amendment is not a shibboleth before which all other rights
must succumb."90
C. Health Law and Policy Considerations
The New York State Legislature has taken steps to ensure
that patients, especially psychiatric patients, receive even more
protection from disturbance than the ordinary private person.
The New York Mental Hygiene Law sets limits on communica-
tions and visits to psychiatric facilities. 91 This demonstrates
the delicate nature of psychiatric treatment and the need for
privacy. Indeed, the Public Health Law commands that every
patient will have the "right to privacy in treatment" because
privacy is imperative for proper treatment and successful
recovery. 92
Although these statutes and regulations were not specifi-
cally enacted to protect patients from the media, the legislative
intent is clear. The state has an interest in affording privacy
and confidentiality to patients seeking psychiatric care in New
York.93 Patients have the right to expect considerate, respectful
care and privacy during treatment, so as to ensure sufficient
protection of their dignity and personal integrity.94
Such patients' rights embody the legislative intent of af-
fording patients privacy, dignity and an optimal therapeutic en-
Vogel v. Hearst Corp., 116 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1952).
90. LeMistral Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting, 61 A.D.2d 491, 494, 402
N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1st Dep't 1978).
91. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 33.5, 33.13 (McKinney Supp. 1994); see also
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 21.2 (1974).
92. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2803-C(3)(f), 2805 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
93. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (4th Dep't 1982);
see also Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 127 Misc. 2d 124, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1985) (finding the conduct of a doctor revealing a patient's psychiatric
background outrageous); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1977); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 774, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (holding that the primary purpose for enacting these
kinds of mental health statutes is to prevent disclosure of facts that might cause
"humiliation, embarrassment and disgrace").
94. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 33.05 (McKinney Supp. 1994); see
also id. §§ 33.13, 33.16; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 21.2 (1974) (further
limitations on visits); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 374.14 (1993) (pa-
tients' rights); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 10, § 405.7 (1993) (patients'
rights); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 587.7 (1993) (patients' rights).
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vironment.95 Psychiatric healthcare providers have drafted
patients' rights policies that adopt the concepts, if not the lan-
guage, of the Mental Hygiene and Public Health laws to assist
in insuring these rights to their patients.96
95. The policy reprinted infra note 96 is from a major psychiatric hospital in
the New York metropolitan area but not the hospital involved in Howell. It is
important to note how many patient's rights actually deal with privacy and confi-
dentiality. Due to the threat posed by the media, hospitals have even enacted spe-
cific "media policies" as a method to protect themselves and their patients.
96. The policy outlined below, from a major New York metropolitan hospital
[hereinafter Patients' Rights Policy] (on file with the author), is indicative of the
kinds of policies established by hospitals to deal with issues of privacy and confi-
dentiality. This typical policy statement is as follows:
[This] hospital endorses the concepts of human dignity embodied in the
Patient's Bill of Rights and in the patients' rights provisions delineated in
10 NYCRR 405.7, 14 NYCRR 372.12, 14 NYCRR 374.14, 14 NYCRR 587.7,
and in the accreditation standards of the JCAHO (RI.1 - RI.2.5). The hospi-
tal will ensure that these rights are respected and made known to patients.
PROCEDURE
A. Pursuant to 10 NYCRR 405.7, the hospital will afford each patient the
right to:
1. exercise the rights delineated in the Patient's Bill of Rights regardless of
the patient's native language or impairment of hearing or vision. Skilled
interpreters shall be provided to assist patients in exercising these rights;
2. treatment without discrimination as to race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, disability, sexual orientation or source of payment;
3. considerate and respectful care in a clean and safe environment;
4. receive emergency medical care as indicated by the patient's medical
condition upon arrival at the hospital;
5. limit the use of physical restraints to those patient restraints author-
ized in writing by a physician after a personal examination of the patient for
a specified and limited period of time to protect the patient from injury to
himself/herself or to others. In an emergency, the restraint may be applied
only by or under the supervision of and at the direction of a registered pro-
fessional nurse who shall set forth in writing the circumstances requiring
the use of restraints. In such emergencies, a physician will be immediately
summoned and pending the arrival of the physician, the patient will be kept
under supervision as warranted by the patient's physical condition and emo-
tional state. At frequent intervals while restraints are in use, the patient's
physical needs, comfort and safety will be monitored. An assessment of the
patient's condition will be made at least once every thirty minutes or at
more frequent intervals if directed by a physician;
6. the name of the medical staff member who has the responsibility for
coordinating his/her care and the right to discuss with his/her practitioner
the type of care being rendered;
7. the name, position and function of any person providing treatment to
the patient;
8. obtain from the responsible medical staff member complete current in-
formation concerning his/her diagnosis, treatment and prognosis, in accord-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/3
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ance with his/her treatment plan, in terms the patient can be reasonably
expected to understand. The patient will be advised of any change in health
status, including harm or injury, the cause for the change and the recom-
mended course of treatment. The information will be made available to an
appropriate person on the patient's behalf and documented in the patient's
medical record, if the patient is not competent to receive such information;
9. receive information necessary to give informed consent prior to the start
of any non-emergency procedure or treatment or both. An informed consent
will include, at a minimum, the specific procedure or treatment or both, the
reasons for it, the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved, and
the alternatives for care or treatment, if any, as a reasonable practitioner
under similar circumstances would disclose. Documented evidence of such
informed consent will be included in the patient's medical record;
10. refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law and to be informed of
the reasonably foreseeable consequences of such refusal;
11. receive from the responsible medical staff or designated hospital repre-
sentatives information necessary to give informed consent prior to the with-
holding of medical care and treatment;
12. privacy consistent with the provisions of appropriate care to the patient;
13. confidentiality of all information and records pertaining to the patient's
treatment, except as otherwise provided by law;
14. a response by the hospital, in a reasonable manner, to the patient's re-
quest for services customarily rendered by the hospital consistent with the
patient's treatment;
15. be informed by the responsible medical staff member or appropriate
hospital staff of the patient's continuing health care requirements following
discharge, and before any transfer to another facility, all relevant informa-
tion about the need for and all reasonable alternatives to such a transfer;
16. prior to discharge, receive an appropriate written discharge plan and a
written description of the patient discharge review process available to the
patient under Federal or State law;
17. be apprised of the identity of any hospital personnel (including stu-
dents) that the hospital has authorized to participate in the patient's treat-
ment; and to refuse treatment, examination and/or observation by any
personnel;
18. refuse to participate in research and human experimentation in accord-
ance with federal and state law;
19. examine and receive an explanation of his/her bill, regardless of source
payment;
20. be informed of the hospital rules and regulations that apply to a pa-
tient's conduct;
21. be admitted to a non-smoking area;
22. register complaints and recommend changes in policies and services to
the facility's staff, the governing authority and the New York State Depart-
ment of Health without fear of reprisal;
23. express complaints about the care and services provided and to have the
hospital investigate such complaints. The hospital will provide the patient
or his/her designee with a written response if requested by the patient indi-
cating the findings of the investigation. The hospital will notify the patient
or his/her designee that if the patient is not satisfied with the hospital's oral
or written response, the patient may complain to the New York State De-
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partment of Health's Office of Health Systems Management. The hospital
shall provide the telephone number of the local area office of the Health
Department to the patient;
24. obtain access to his/her medical record pursuant to the provisions of
Part 50 of this title. The hospital will impose reasonable charges for all cop-
ies of medical records provided to patients, not to exceed costs incurred by
the hospital. A patient will not be denied a copy of his/her medical record
solely because of inability to pay; and
25. receive supportive services to meet the changing care needs of the pa-
tient and the patient's family/representative provided by qualified individu-
als who collectively have expertise in assessing the special needs of hospital
patients and their families.
B. Pursuant to 14 NYCRR 587.7, patients admitted to any [hospital] outpa-
tient program are entitled to the following rights:
1. Patients have the right to an individualized plan of treatment services
and to participate to the fullest extent consistent with the patient's capacity
in the establishment and revision of that plan.
2. Patents have the right to a full explanation of services provided in ac-
cordance with their treatment plan.
3. Participation in treatment in an outpatient program is voluntary and
patients are presumed to have the capacity to consent to such treatment.
The right to participate voluntarily in and to consent to treatment shall be
limited only to the extent that:
a. section 330.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and Part 541 of Title 14
NYCRR provide for court-ordered receipt of outpatient services;
b. articles 77 and 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law provide for the surro-
gate consent of a court-appointed conservator or committee;
c. section 33.21 of the Mental Hygiene Law provides for the surrogate
consent of a parent or guardian of a minor;
d. a patient engages in conduct which poses a risk of physical harm to
himself or others.
4. While a patient's full participation in treatment is a central goal, a pa-
tient's objection to his or her treatment plan, or disagreement with any por-
tion thereof, shall not, in and of itself, result in the patient's termination
from the program unless such objection renders the patient's continued par-
ticipation in the program clinically inappropriate or would endanger the
safety of the patient or others;
5. the confidentiality of patient's clinical records shall be maintained in ac-
cordance with section 33.13 of the Mental Hygiene Law;
6. patients shall be assured access to their clinical records consistent with
section 33.16 of the Mental Hygiene Law;
7. patients have the right to receive clinically appropriate care and treat-
ment that is suited to their needs and skillfully, safely and humanely admin-
istered with full respect for their dignity and personal integrity;
8. patients have the right to receive services in such a manner as to assure
nondiscrimination;
9. patients have the right to be treated in a way which acknowledges and
respects their cultural environment;
10. patients have the right to a maximum amount of privacy consistent with
the effective delivery of services;
11. patients have the right to freedom from abuse and mistreatment by
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/3
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Patients' rights policies deal with the need to provide care
in a considerate and respectful environment.9 7 Privacy and con-
fidentiality of "all information," not just medical records, are ex-
plicitly stated as specific patients' rights.98 Patients have the
right to receive clinically appropriate care and treatment, hu-
manely administered with full respect for their dignity and per-
sonal integrity.99
employees;
12. patients have the right to be informed of the provider's patient griev-
ance policies and procedures, and to initiate any question, complaint or ob-
jection accordingly;
13. patients have access to the New York State Commission on Quality of
Care for the Mentally Disabled and other advocacy groups such as the Pro-
tection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individual program, and Alliance for
the Mentally Ill and the Regional Office of Mental Health. Information
about how to contact any of these agencies will be provided to patients upon
request.
Id. at 1-6 (emphasis added). Another policy statement from the same hospital,
[hereinafter Press Statement] (on file with author), concerns hospital policies when
dealing with the media:
POLICY
The Director of Community Relations should be contacted for all media re-
quests, regardless of the subject matter. To insure that media coverage is in
the best interest of the hospital, no statement should be released or inter-
views granted to the press without the Director being first notified. Like-
wise, to ensure maximum efficiency and accuracy in responding to media
requests, it is essential that all hospital and medical personnel fully cooper-
ate in providing the Director with immediate access to information.
PROCEDURE
When a reporter calls or visits the hospital requesting information about a
patient, incident, etc., the reporter should be referred to the Office of Com-
munity Relations. If a crisis occurs at the hospital (explosion, fire, walkout,
etc.) which would likely attract press coverage, the Director of Community
Relations should be contacted immediately by the Administrator on call or
other appropriate administrator(s).
When a person of celebrity status is admitted to the hospital the Director of
Community Relations should be contacted immediately by the Administrator
on call or other appropriate administrator(s).
When reporters call or visit the hospital requesting information for a feature
story not related to an emergency situation, they should be directed to contact
the Director of Community Relations.
Id. at 1.
97. Patients' Rights Policy, supra note 96, at 1.
98. Id. at 2-3.
99. Id. at 5.
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A lack of respect for patients' rights concerning privacy and
confidentiality resurfaced in Andrews v. Bruk.100 Although the
case did not deal with the media or specifically with psychiatric
care, it did deal with the rights of privacy and confidentiality to
which patients should be entitled. In Andrews, the defendant, a
nontreating physician, attached a copy of the plaintiff's medical
records as an exhibit to court papers he was filing in a personal
action. 101
The court noted that the "critical issue involved in this mat-
ter is the applicability of one of the least utilized and under-
stood doctrines of law - the tort of intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress."10 2 While aware of the limited suc-
cess emotional distress claims have had, especially with the
Court of Appeals, 10 3 the Andrews court found defendant's
breach of the plaintiff's patients' rights to be "reprehensible,"
especially in light of the "unauthorized acquisition" of the medi-
cal records at issue. 04 "The average person in the community
could well find that the defendant's conduct exceeded all bounds
usually tolerated by decent society and so abused his position as
a physician as to seriously effect plaintiff's [patient's] rights
"105
100. Andrews v. Bruk, 160 Misc. 2d 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1994).
101. Id. at 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 753. In Andrews, the defendant physician
attached the plaintiff's medical record (vasectomy surgery), without consent, as an
exhibit to an affidavit in defendant's divorce action. Id.
102. Id. Even after Howell, courts continue to struggle with this tort and how
to best protect patient's rights.
103. Id. at 623, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
104. Id. at 624, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 756. Recall that in Howell the Post tres-
passed onto hospital grounds and then, without consent, took photographs of pri-
vate psychiatric patients and published them against medical warning. Howell, 81
N.Y.2d at 118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
105. Andrews, 160 Misc. 2d at 624, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 756 (citation omitted). In
addition, the court seems to have asserted its right to decide this issue, as opposed
to appellate review, by citing Lovcen Const. v. Culbreth, 196 A.D.2d 445, 601
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1993); Long v. Beneficial Fin., 39 A.D.2d 11, 330 N.Y.S.2d





III. The Case: Howell v. The New York Post
A. The Facts
The appellant, Mrs. Howell, was a patient at a private psy-
chiatric hospital in New York State.10 6 The hospital was set
back and hidden from view by a considerable amount of wooded
property in a quiet, secluded setting. 10 7 The entrance to the
hospital was clearly marked and "no trespassing" signs were
posted. 08 In short, the appearance of the hospital and its en-
trance was not that of a public thoroughfare. It looked very
much like what it was - a secluded private hospital. 0 9
At the same time that Mrs. Howell was hospitalized, Hedda
Nussbaum, a key witness in a highly publicized abuse/homicide
case, was admitted for psychiatric treatment." 0 The New York
Post had sent still-photojournalists to obtain photographs of Ms.
Nussbaum for use in articles about the homicide."'
These journalists, without invitation or consent, tres-
passed onto hospital grounds in their vehicle and used a tele-
photo lens to photograph Hedda Nussbaum and other patients
at the hospital." 2 Some photos were taken while the journalists
were concealed, observing the patients from a distance. 1 3 Upon
learning of these activities, the hospital Medical Director con-
tacted the Post's photography editor." 4 First, the Director in-
sisted that the Post refrain from trespassing upon hospital
property. 1 5 Second, the Post was warned against publishing
any photographs of the patients because of the adverse psycho-
106. Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 118, 612 N.E.2d 699, 700, 596
N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (1993).
107. Brief for Appellant at 4, Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612
N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993) (No. 43723/89) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
Hedda Nussbaum was the "adoptive" mother of Lisa Steinberg. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 4-5; see also Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at
118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
114. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351; see
also Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 5.




logical impact such publication could have upon the patients
involved. 116
Although the Post eventually agreed never to trespass
again,117 the Medical Director's warnings were dismissed and a
large, full length, clearly identifiable photograph of Hedda
Nussbaum and Mrs. Howell was published on the following
morning's front page. 118 Follow-up articles, including photos,
were published on subsequent pages. 119
The hospital immediately sought injunctive relief and the
Post was enjoined from further trespass. 20 Unfortunately,
there was no such relief for Mrs. Howell,whose hospitalization
was completely confidential and known only to a few close fam-
ily members. As a direct result of the publication, Mrs. Howell's
psychiatric hospitalization became known to friends, business
associates and other family members, as well as the Post's gen-
eral readership. 121 Mrs. Howell was devastated upon seeing the
photographs and suffered a severely compromised recovery, re-
quiring further treatment and counseling. 122 Due to the re-
sponse she experienced after discharge, new employment and
drastic lifestyle changes were necessary. 123  Mrs. Howell
brought an action against the Post alleging, amongst other
things, invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional
distress. 124
B. Procedural History
The Post, prior to discovery, moved for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action
116. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351; see
also Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 5.
117. Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 5.
118. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 118, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351; see
also Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 5.
119. Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 5.
120. Four Winds Hosp. v. New York Post, No. 15578-88 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County Nov. 29, 1988) (Ruskin, J.) (order granting preliminary injunction), in Rec-
ord on Appeal at 27, Howell v. New York Post, 181 A.D.2d 597, 581 N.Y.S.2d 330
(1st Dep't 1992) (No. 43723/89) [hereinafter Record on Appeal].
121. Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 6.
122. Id.
123. Id.




upon which relief could be granted. 125 Essentially, the Post re-
lied on its right to "free press" and the right to report on a
"newsworthy" public figure (Hedda Nussbaum).126 Mrs. Howell
cross-moved for summary judgment on liability and relied heav-
ily upon the findings of the court presiding over the injunction
and settlement of the action by the hospital against the Post.127
In a relatively detailed decision, the New York County
Supreme Court opined that at the heart of the complaint was an
allegation of violated privacy.' 28 After a review of the record,
the court determined that Hedda Nussbaum was indeed "news-
worthy."129 It did recognize that "newspapers are not immune
from liability for torts and crimes committed while gathering
the news," but stated that a "plaintiff must state [a] cognizable
cause[ I of action."130 The court then dismissed all but the cause
of action for emotional distress. 13'
Regarding that remaining cause of action, the court said
"with respect to the allegations of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress another result obtains." 32 The Post had argued
that its conduct was not "atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community." 33 Specifically citing the fact that the Post
was issued a medical warning against publication of patient
photographs, however, the court found the conduct to be outra-
geous. 34 The court stated that "the Post was on notice of the
likelihood that the publication would cause psychological dis-
tress to the subjects of those photos." 35 The court went on to
125. Notice of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Howell v. New York Post, (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (No. 43723/89), in Record on Appeal, supra note 120, at 9-
10.
126. Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Howell v. New York Post (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (No. 43723/89), in Record on Appeal, supra note 120, at 11-
12.
127. Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Cross Mo-
tion of Summary Judgment, Howell v. New York Post, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1990), in Record on Appeal, supra note 120, at 67-69.
128. Howell v. New York Post, No. 43723/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990), in
Record on Appeal, supra note 120, at 8-2.
129. Id. at 8-3.
130. Id. at 8-5.
131. Id. at 8-5 to -6.
132. Id. at 8-6.
133. Id.





state that "the general problem which pervades claims of emo-
tional distress, to wit, the amorphous nature of the tort and the
concomitant subjective nature of the damages is not present in
this case." 136
As a result, the Post's motion to dismiss was granted to the
extent that all causes of action were dismissed except inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 137 Plaintiff's cross-motion
on liability was denied.138 Mrs. Howell appealed the dismissal
of the invasion of privacy claim to the Appellate Division, First
Department and the Post cross-appealed the trial court's main-
tenance of the emotional distress cause of action.139
Mrs. Howell argued that the Post had used the photograph
as an "eye-catcher" to enhance that particular issue of the news-
paper. 140 As a result, it was argued, the Post had used Mrs.
Howell's likeness for trade/advertizing purposes (as an adver-
tisement in disguise) without consent and in violation of section
51 of the New York State Civil Rights Law.' 4' It was also ar-
gued that Mrs. Howell was in no way associated with Hedda
Nussbaum.142
The Appellate Division issued a brief decision holding that
Hedda Nussbaum was "newsworthy" and that the photographs
bore a "real relationship" to the article. 43 The Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim.'"
Furthermore, it modified the order of the trial court and dis-
missed the remaining cause of action, reasoning that publica-
tion of a recognizable photograph of the plaintiff was not
grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.145
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 8-8 to -9.
138. Id.
139. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 119, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
140. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Respondents at 12, Howell v. New
York Post, 181 A.D.2d 597, 581 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1st Dep't 1992) (No. 43723/89) [here-
inafter Respondent's Brief].
141. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAw § 51 (McKinney 1992).
142. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 140, at 10.







Since the First Department did not address the claim of
reckless conduct rising to the level of intent, a motion for leave
to appeal was filed before the New York State Court of Appeals.
The motion was granted and the appeal perfected. 146
C. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the action by the Appellate Division but offered in-
teresting reasoning that could be used to provide relief, under
"the right facts," in the future. 147 This decision at least appears
to open the door to actions against a media entity for the inflic-
tion of emotional distress pursuant to the way the news is gath-
ered and published.148
While reviewing the pertinent facts, the court specifically
referred to the trespass, the potential "newsworthy" nature of
the photographs, and the medical warning against publica-
tion. 49 The court addressed the issues of privacy violation and
infliction of emotional distress.150 It specifically pointed to the
novel nature of the appeal stating that it brought "together two
separate bodies of law, each with a long history that is relevant
to resolution of the issues . . .. "1
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Citing nineteenth century cases such as Mitchell v. Roches-
ter Railway Co., the court noted the historical aversion to al-
lowing claims of emotional distress. 152 Indeed, the court recited
two specific concerns that have transcended a century of law:
the potential for a flood of litigation and, relatedly, the potential
for an increase in false claims. 153
146. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 119, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
147. Id. at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356. Judge Smith took no
part in the decision and was recused due to his participation in the Appellate Divi-
sion decision. See id. at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
148. Id. at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
149. Id. at 118-19, 612 N.E.2d at 700, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
150. Id. at 119, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
151. Id.
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As time passed, however, courts struggled with the need to
compensate the victims of "unacceptable behavior."154 The Re-
statement of Torts itself initially "insulated an actor from liabil-
ity for causing solely emotional distress ... ."155 The court then
recounted the contributions of a 1936 Harvard Law Review arti-
cle by Calvert Magruder on emotional disturbance and the law
which pointed out that "courts were already giving extensive
protection to feelings and emotions"156 as well as Professor Pros-
ser's suggestion that it was "high time" to acknowledge the va-
lidity of such claims. 157 The court also noted that the Second
Restatement had changed direction to allow liability for the in-
fliction of emotional distress. 158
The court then recited the four elements of the tort: 1) out-
rageous conduct; 2) intent or disregard for the substantial possi-
bility of infliction of emotional distress (recklessness); 3)
154. Id.
155. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b (1965). The Second Restatement of
Torts did specifically provide liability for both intentional and reckless (reckless-
ness rising to the level of intent) infliction of emotional distress. Id. § 46. Mrs.
Howell argued reckless infliction of emotional distress, as opposed to intentional
conduct, to the court. Appellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 8-11. Importantly, the
cases that had been before the Court of Appeals prior to Howell often dealt with
intentional infliction of emotional distress coupled with other claims of intentional
conduct such as harassment and malicious prosecution. Although it was eventu-
ally admitted by the Post at oral argument before the Court of Appeals that Mrs.
Howell's image was "intentionally" kept in the photos because it made "a good foil,"
the fact remained that the Post had initially trespassed to obtain photos of Hedda
Nussbaum also admitted as a patient at the hospital. Appellant's Brief, supra note
107, at 4-5. To maintain credibility and to focus arguments, the claim of reckless
infliction of emotional distress was argued. Id.
The Post argued that there was no cause of action for reckless infliction of
emotional distress and even went so far as to argue that a pattern of intentional
malicious conduct was necessary to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Respondent's Brief, supra note 140, at 39-40. Mrs. Howell pointed
out, however, that the current law allowed for both intentional and reckless inflic-
tion of emotional distress and "a need" for a pattern of intentional malicious con-
duct to prove both was, by definition, illogical. Appellant's Brief, supra note 107,
at 4-5.
156. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 121, 612 N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (citing
Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1064 (1936)).
157. Id. (citing William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:
A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 881 (1939)).
158. Id. The Second Restatement of Torts allowed liability for the intentional





causation; and 4) severe emotional distress.159 Observing that
there was no specifically proscribed conduct for this tort, the
court noted that it "is as limitless as the human capacity for
cruelty."160 The court then stated that "[t]he price for this flexi-
bility ... is a tort that. . . may overlap other areas of the law"
(such as in this case) and impose liability, possibly without no-
tice, for conduct that might otherwise be lawful.161 To balance
this, the court noted that the rigorous requirements of this tort
are "'difficult to satisfy.' "162 The conduct, according to the deci-
sion, must be "beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable .... -163 Indeed, the Court of
Appeals stated that "of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims considered by this Court, every one has failed
because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous." 164
2. The Right to Privacy
Although Mrs. Howell only briefly referenced arguments
previously made to the Appellate Division, First Department
concerning a violation of section 51 of the New York State Civil
Rights Law, the Post strenuously argued that Mrs. Howell's ac-
tion was a privacy claim "disguised" as an emotional distress
claim. 165 Indeed, the Post argued that Mrs. Howell's sole rem-
edy was under the civil rights law.16 The court, however, did
159. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 121, 612 N.E.2d at 702, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting KEETON E r AL., supra note 15, § 12, at 60-61).
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis added). If the courts cannot protect New York state pa-
tients from this kind of conduct because it is not deemed "outrageous enough," the
Legislature must act.
165. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 140, at 28.
166. Id. It was the opinion of counsel for Mrs. Howell that this strategy was
employed by the Post for two reasons. First, the Post would have a stronger argu-
ment since, as detailed below, a claim under the civil rights law was difficult. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, it would allow the Post to avoid a review of its "free
press" rights. The court, however, decided to review both types of claims including
the constitutional concept of "privileged conduct." Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 119-24,
612 N.E.2d at 701-04, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 352-55.
The court pointed out that the "[defendants would have our analysis end
here-without considering whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress .... " Id. at 125, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596
N.Y.S.2d at 355. The court, as Mrs. Howell requested, did review the case in terms




not agree. As is detailed below, the court reviewed both claims
in relation to the facts of the case. 167
The Court of Appeals recognized that there was no common
law right to privacy in New York. 168 It limited its analysis
solely to sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,
noting that privacy rights only applied to a commercial protec-
tion of "a living person's name portrait or picture for 'advertis-
ing' or 'trade' purposes without prior written consent."1 69
Interestingly, the Howell court cited and appears to have
repeated the same fundamental analytical strategy used in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.' 70 In Roberson, as in
Howell, the court cited considerable scholarship on the law of
privacy but provided no relief because it failed to find legal "sup-
port" for a tortious invasion of privacy theory.' 7' The Howell
court even acknowledged that its decision in Roberson was
"roundly criticized .... [and that] [t]he Legislature responded
by enacting the Nation's first statutory right to privacy now
codified as sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law." 172
Notwithstanding, after briefly discussing other "privacy
torts" such as unreasonable publicity, unreasonable intrusion
and false light, the Howell court decided not to expand the law
and create a common law right to privacy. 73 Despite its history
with Roberson, or perhaps because of it, the court reasoned that
"recovery for invasion of privacy is best left to the
Legislature." 74
167. Id. at 123, 612 N.E.2d at 703, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 354. Furthermore, there
were additional facts such as the medical warning and notice which are irrelevant
to any claim under the privacy statutes, but which would be critical to a tort claim
such as infliction of emotional distress.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.; Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 578, 64 N.E. 442
(1902).




174. Id.; see also David D. Siegel, Court Examines Right of Privacy and Tort of
Inflicting Emotional Harm, and Exonerates Newspaper for Publishing Photo of
Psychiatric Patient Walking with Public Figure, N.Y. ST. LAW DIG., Aug. 1993, at 1.
The article stated that
[tihe case occasions a review by the Court of Appeals of both categories of
claim, but brings no relief to the plaintiff, who loses on both counts.
[Vol. 15:459484
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IV. Analysis
Although there were no cases directly on point, the Court of
Appeals noted that all of the emotional distress claims it had
previously considered failed for lack of sufficiently outrageous
conduct, as was ultimately decided here. 175 One aspect of Mrs.
Howell's case that the Court of Appeals did acknowledge, how-
ever, was that the tort of "intentional" infliction of emotional
distress can be based upon reckless conduct.176 The Post argued
that reckless infliction of emotional distress was a new tort and
not actionable in New York.177 The court did not agree, nor did
it end its analysis with statutory "privacy" considerations 178 as
the Post had urged. 179 Rather, the court considered the tort
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and unequiv-
ocally stated that it had adopted the "Restatement formulation"
which describes both intentional and reckless conduct as being
sources of liability.180
Whatever the photographer did did not amount to anything actionable
under present statutes or under any theory the Court of Appeals was willing
to adopt. Should this kind of thing become actionable, therefore, it will have
to be the legislature that makes it so, and it hasn't made it so yet.
Id.
175. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 125-26, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
Furthermore, the type of emotional distress inflicted in Howell was reckless in na-
ture, not intentional as was true in the cases cited by the court. Id. at 126, 612
N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
176. Id. at 125, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355. This Article focuses
upon the aspects of the case dealing with infliction of emotional distress - essen-
tially, the main argument made by Mrs. Howell. The first part of the court's "Ap-
plication of the Law to the Present Appeal" actually dealt with the Post's "privacy"
arguments. Id. at 124-26, 612 N.E.2d at 704-05, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56. It is the
remainder of the decision upon which this article focuses. Id. at 125-26, 612
N.E.2d at 704-05, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56.
177. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 140, at 38-39.
178. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 125-26, 612 N.E.2d at 704-05, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355-
56.
179. Id.; see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 140, at 37.
180. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 121, 612 N.E.2d at 702, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 353; see
supra note 19. Mrs. Howell made an additional argument in which, at oral argu-
ment, the court seemed most interested: that the clear and unmistakable intent
behind the privacy statute was to protect the property right of an individual's like-
ness from commercial exploitation. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 68, at 16;
see also Gautier v. Pro-Football, 278 A.D. 431, 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 560 (1st
Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc.
2d 329, 331-32, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (finding that
"the statute was obviously aimed at exploitation for purposes of commerce").
27
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Notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals held that the Post's
conduct was "privileged" and that it was within its constitu-
tional rights to publish the photographs in question. 181 Again
citing the Restatement, the court stated that even if the conduct
might otherwise be considered outrageous, it may yet be privi-
leged and so protected.'82 In fact, at least referencing the warn-
ing issue in Howell, the court opined that even if the Post was
aware that it would inflict emotional distress upon the patients
involved, its conduct might still be privileged. 183 The court then
cited Hustler Magazine v. Falwelll8 4 for the proposition that the
publication of a newsworthy photograph was considered a "priv-
ileged-conduct exception." 185
The plaintiff in Hustler was Mr. Falwell, a nationally
known minister and political commentator. Mr. Falwell sued to
recover damages stemming from defendant Hustler magazine's
publication of a parody depicting Mr. Falwell as having "en-
gaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in
an outhouse."186 The United States Supreme Court stated that
the "case presents us with a novel question involving First
Amendment limitations upon a State's authority to protect its
citizens from intentional infliction of emotional distress."187 The
Court reasoned that "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is
Indeed, courts have specifically held that redress against the media for tor-
tious conduct is independent from any § 51 claim. Vogel v. Hearst Corp., 116
N.Y.S. 905, 906 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1952) ("Apart from these statutes there is
no so-called 'right of privacy' except in so far as invasion of a person's privacy in-
volves other tortious acts .... ."). Mrs. Howell argued that the clear intent behind
sections 50 and 51 was to be a remedy for commercial exploitation and not as a
way to preempt all other forms of redress. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 68,
at 16-19; see also Flores v. Mosler Safe, 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855,
196 N.Y.S.2d 978, 978 (1959) ("[T]he purpose of the statute is remedial and rooted
in an individual's right to be free from commercial exploitation."); Freihofer v.
Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 140, 480 N.E.2d 349, 353, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738
(1985).
There is no evidence that the New York Legislature meant the 'privacy stat-
utes' to preempt all other forms of redress for tortious conduct, as the Post sug-
gested. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 68, at 16-17.
181. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 124-25, 612 N.E.2d at 704-05, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
182. Id. at 125-26, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
183. Id. at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
184. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
185. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 765, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
186. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.




the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow
of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest."88
Detailing the public nature of Mr. Falwell's life, the Court
opined that such public persons must, essentially, have tougher
skins. 89 The Court held that "the candidate who vaunts his
spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry
'Foul' when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to
demonstrate the contrary." 90
The Court then reserved any remedy for alleged infliction of
emotional distress upon a public figure for situations involving
malice or ill will, stating:
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict
emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude,
and it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions
have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in ques-
tion is sufficiently "outrageous." But in the world of debate about
public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than
admirable are protected by the First Amendment. 191
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the publication
was privileged conduct in the sense that Hustler was exercising
its right to comment on a public figure, 9 2 and concluded:
that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publica-
tions such as the one here at issue without showing in addition
that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was
made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that the state-
ment was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it
was true. This is not merely a 'blind application' of the New York
Times standard, it reflects our considered judgment that such a
standard is necessary to give adequate "breathing space" to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
193
188. Id. at 50-51.
189. Id. at 51-52.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 53. Actually, this reasoning bolsters Mrs. Howell's claim, since she
was in no way a public figure.
192. Id. at 56.
193. Id. (citation omitted). The author does not agree that the 'thick skin'
New York Times standard should apply to private or even public persons when
such persons are hospitalized for mental illness. Patients are, by definition, al-




The wisdom of requiring public figures to have higher toler-
ance for emotional distress can be debated, but not when that
public figure is hospitalized for mental illness, such as Hedda
Nussbaum. The legislative intent behind many New York state
patients' rights statutes (rights that apply to all patients) would
appear to invalidate any such concept. 94
Nonetheless, this theory is inapplicable to Mrs. Howell
since she was not a public figure and never thrust herself into
the public light, other than to have been hospitalized with
Hedda Nussbaum at Four Winds Hospital. Rather, it was Mrs.
Howell's intent to do the exact opposite. The Howell court's
comparison of Mr. Falwell to Mrs. Howell shows tenuous rea-
soning and when coupled with the fact that a medical warning
against publication was ignored, demonstrates a misapplication
of the privileged-conduct rule.
A. Privacy
Noting that the core claim was the unauthorized publica-
tion of Mrs. Howell's photograph, the court first evaluated the
Post's conduct under a theory of invasion of privacy. 195 It stated
there was no cause of action for the "publication of truthful but
embarrassing facts."196 Unfortunately, this aspect of the opin-
ion trivializes the importance of patients' rights. 97
The court stated that since the photograph bore a "real re-
lationship" to the article, it was not an advertisement in dis-
guise nor used for trade or advertising purposes. 198 Thus, the
194. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
195. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 122-24, 612 N.E.2d at 703-04, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 354-
55.
196. Id. at 124, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355; see also infra note
183.
197. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
198. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 124, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355. With-
out specifics, the court stated that the publication was "plainly not a veiled adver-
tisement" dismissing any argument about an "advertisement in disguise" or the
use of the photograph to sell that particular issue of the Post. Id. Such arguments
were raised by Mrs. Howell to the Appellate Division and referenced to a lesser
degree to the Court of Appeals. This is an interesting point since counsel for the
Post actually acknowledged at the oral argument before the Court of Appeals that
one of the reasons Mrs. Howell's image was used and not cropped or airbrushed
out of the photograph was, indeed, because she was attractive and made "a good
foil" or a good photo. The Post thereby admitted it used Mrs. Howell as an eye-




court reasoned, any claim under the civil rights law would fail
and further decided that it would not "intrude upon reasonable
editorial judgments ... ."199
Indeed, without being asked, the court seems to have ex-
panded the meaning of "reasonable relationship." It reasoned
that the exclusion of Mrs. Howell's image might have changed
the "visual impact" of the photo.200 Under this reasoning, an
editor could argue that any type of exclusion might alter the
"visual impact" of a photograph. Therefore, it appears that
"real relationship" may now depend on nothing more than an
editor's subjective opinion. 201
Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law,20 2 however, is
simply not an adequate protection of privacy for psychiatric pa-
tients in this state. Under most circumstances, the publication
and sale of the news is not considered "trade."203 Unless the
news publication is deemed an advertisement in disguise, it is
considered privileged conduct and not subject to the only pri-
vacy law in New York.204
More importantly, the privacy statute was intended to pre-
vent commercial exploitation. 20 5 It was not meant as an all-en-
compassing right of privacy, preempting other forms of redress
for tortious conduct.206 Additionally, the concept of warning or
notice of a "mental condition or peculiarity"207-critical to the
claim of outrageous conduct in Howell-is irrelevant to the pri-
199. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 124, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
200. Id. at 125, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
201. Id. at 124-25, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355. See also Finger v.
Omni Publications Int'l Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 566 N.E.2d 141, 144, 564
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (1990).
202. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
203. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 123, 612 N.E.2d at 703, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 354. See
also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
204. Murray v. New York Magazine, 27 N.Y.2d 406, 409, 267 N.E.2d 474,476,
318 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (1971).
205. Gautier v. Pro-Football, 278 A.D. 431, 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 560 (1st
Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc.
2d 329, 331-32, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (finding that
"the statute was obviously aimed at exploitation for purposes of commerce").
206. Vogel v. Hearst Corp., 116 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1952) ("Apart from these statutes there is no so called right of privacy' except in so
far as invasion of a person's privacy involves other tortious acts ...




vacy statute208 and only has applicability in the law of torts. 20 9
Finally, strategically arguing that all "privacy claims" must be
litigated under the civil rights law is not only inaccurate, it di-
verts attention away from the tort remedy of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. This tactic, employed by the Post,
was recognized and rejected by the Howell court.210
B. Emotional Distress
The court went on, as requested by Mrs. Howell, to review
the Post's conduct in relation to the tortious claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.211 The court cited the
Post's argument that this tort could not be used as an "end run"
around the privacy statutes, and then held that the Post's con-
duct fell within the realm of "privileged conduct."212 The court
cited the Restatement of Torts and established case law to ex-
plain that liability cannot be imposed for taking an action
within one's legal rights (e.g., the media publishing the
news).2 1 3
There are some troubling questions left unanswered by this
decision. Although the Court discussed section 46, comment (g)
of the Restatement, cited by the Post for the "privileged-con-
duct" proposition, it failed to address Restatement section com-
ments cited by Mrs. Howell which were more relevant to the
case.214 For example, comment (c) specifically left open for the
future "other situations in which liability may be imposed," in-
dicating that this is a dynamic and fluid area of the law.215
Comment (d) notes that the type of conduct necessary is the
kind, as this author believes was present here, that would lead
the average member of the community "to exclaim,
'Outrageous!' ,,216
Most importantly, however, the court did not address com-
ment (f), which states that the "extreme and outrageous nature
208. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
210. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 125, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
211. Id.
212. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 124-25, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
213. Id. at 125-26, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
214. Appellant's Brief supra note 107, at 12 (cmt. d), 19 (cmt. fD.
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965).




of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the
other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason
of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity" and that
the "conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous
when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge .... "217
Following this comment to the Restatement there is a most in-
teresting example postulated:
A is in a hospital suffering from a heart illness and under medical
orders that he shall have complete rest and quiet. B enters A's
room for the purpose of trying to settle an insurance claim. B's
insistence and boisterous conduct cause severe emotional upset
and A suffers a heart attack. B is subject to liability to A if he
knows of A's condition. 218
In other words, if the conduct of the defendant in this example
caused emotional distress that negatively impacted upon the
cardiac condition for which the plaintiff was being treated and if
the defendant had notice of that condition, liability would'
attach.
Mrs. Howell was admitted for a psychiatric illness. A spe-
cific medical warning not to publish her photograph was given
by the hospital Medical Director, but it was ignored by the Post
editors. The Post was, therefore, on notice of Mrs. Howell's con-
dition.21 9 The Post's conduct (publication) caused emotional dis-
tress that negatively impacted upon the psychiatric condition
for which Mrs. Howell was being treated. The Post should have
been subject to liability because it had knowledge of Mrs.
Howell's condition.220 Since the Post "proceed[ed] in the face of
217. Id. cmt. f (emphasis added).
218. Id. Based on this comment alone, the court should have reinstated Mrs.
Howell's case and let the jury decide if the facts were outrageous. See also Haho v.
Laurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961). Since, in Howell, the
Court of Appeals explicitly adopted the Second Restatement section regarding
reckless infliction of emotional distress, it should have at least addressed this as-
pect of Mrs. Howell's argument in its decision. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 121, 612
N.E.2d at 701, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 353. See also Andrews v. Bruk, 160 Misc. 2d 618,
610 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1994).
219. In addition, as outlined in part I, the hospital to which Mrs. Howell was
admitted looked very much like what it was - a private psychiatric hospital. Ap-
pellant's Brief, supra note 107, at 4. Additionally, since the Post was interested in
Hedda Nussbaum because she was at a psychiatric hospital, the Post clearly had
constructive notice as well as the actual notice given by the Medical Director.
220. Actually there was a nonspecific denial of any warning, made for the first




such knowledge," their conduct is appropriately labeled "outra-
geous" under comment f. Moreover, since we may presume that
the Restatement intended the term "outrageous" to have the
same meaning in both comments d and f, such conduct on the
part of the Post should satisfy the outrageous conduct element
of a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The trial court even opined that "the general problem
which pervades claims of emotional distress, to wit, the amor-
phous nature of the tort and the concomitant subjective nature
of the damages, is not present in this case."2 21
The Court of Appeals only cited cases that dealt with
"newsworthy" persons or persons in public places. Yet, Mrs.
Howell was in a private psychiatric hospital and not news-
worthy other than happening to be at the same hospital as
Hedda Nussbaum. Furthermore, the court did not discuss the
fact that in virtually all of the cases cited by the Post, the media
either had specific consent to be on the scene or was there by
right (public place or record), obviously not the case in Howell.
No other case was cited where there was a specific medical
warning against publication. The court, however, only felt that
"embarrassing facts" were revealed and this seems to have been
the underling premise for denying a remedy to Mrs. Howell. 222
The court held this opinion even though earlier courts had al-
ready determined that the state did indeed have a specific inter-
est in the "protection of patients .... [and] the mentally ill...
and thus sav[ing] patients from humiliation, embarrassment
and disgrace."22
Finally, the court did not address the fact that Mrs.
Howell's inclusion in the photographs was simply not necessary
and too tangential to the "newsworthy event" to warrant such a
221. Howell v. New York Post, No. 43723/89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 12,
1990) (Huff, J.).
222. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 125, 612 N.E.2d at 704, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
223. Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 774, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (1944). In
Munzer, the defendant, a Medical Superintendent at Rockland State Hospital, dis-
closed the plaintiff's medical record to a third party while the plaintiff was still a
patient at the hospital. Id. at 774, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 916. The court held that the
defendant's conduct violated the Mental Hygiene Law. Id. at 775, 49 N.Y.S.2d at
917. "Clearly, the statute was enacted in the interest of the public generally and
for the benefit and protection of patients." Id. at 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 916. Its pri-
mary purpose was to prevent unlawful disclosure of medical information "and thus




risk of grave harm. In fact, this issue was specifically addressed
by the trial court in the hospital's related action against the
Post.224 That court noted it was "abundantly clear from the pa-
pers and the various exhibits that the defendant Post and its
photographers and reporters knew that [the hospital] was a pri-
vate psychiatric hospital and that the patients confined therein
are emotionally disturbed and are there for treatment and reha-
bilitation and not for uninvited picture taking ....
Notwithstanding, the court did offer what may be the most
important statement on the issue of media liability for infliction
of emotional distress. The Court of Appeals stated that "publi-
cation-without more-could not ordinarily lead to liability for
intentional infliction of emotional distress."226 The court did not
"explore" what circumstances might overcome the privileged-
conduct doctrine, and left the meaning of "without more" wide
open to interpretation.227 Nevertheless, and more importantly,
when read in the alternative, the court seems to have said that
publication - without more - sometimes could lead to liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
It is this author's opinion that the New York State Court of
Appeals has for the first time stated that, under "the right set of
facts," a media entity's methods of gathering and publishing the
224. Four Winds Hosp. v. New York Post, No. 15578-88 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County Nov. 29, 1988) (Ruskin, J.).
225. Id. at 3.
226. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 125, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (em-
phasis added). Due to the Post's bankruptcy filing just prior to oral argument on
appeal, the conduct of the corporate defendant (the Post's editors) was not ad-
dressed in the first part of the decision rendered. Id. Only the conduct of the non-
corporate defendants (the individual reporters) was reviewed. Id. Their trespass
was not considered as conduct "beyond all possible bounds of decency." Id.
Clearly, the really "outrageous" conduct was on the part of the Post's editors, who
were given a specific medical warning not to publish photographs of the psychiatric
patients. Id. Indeed, the core issue of the warning was not even addressed in the
decision reviewing the reporters' conduct, since they were not responsible for the
actual publication. Id.
Unfortunately, when the bankruptcy stay pursuant to this specific case was
lifted and the court rendered the final part of the decision regarding the corporate
defendant, it offered no further reasoning to explain the ultimate holding and, sur-
prisingly, no mention of the warning issue was made. Id. at 125, 612 N.E.2d at
705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356. Thus, the court never specifically commented on
whether the refusal to heed a medical warning against the nonconsensual publica-
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news may cause liability for infliction of emotional distress.228
Indeed, the court even stated that it "did not mean to suggest
... that the plaintiff could never defeat the privilege and state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."229
C. Patient's Rights
This decision is a start, but it far from protects New York
patients from the kind of harm inflicted in Howell. The New
York State Legislature has enacted patients' rights statutes to
ensure that patients, especially psychiatric patients, receive
even more protection from disturbance than the ordinary pri-
vate person.23° The New York Mental Hygiene Law sets limits
on communications and visits to psychiatric facilities, 231 recog-
nizing the delicate nature of psychiatric treatment and the need
for privacy.
Statutory patients' rights include "considerate and respect-
ful care" and "a maximum amount of privacy consistent with
the effective delivery of services."232 These patients' rights are
so important the Legislature has commanded "each patient or
patient representative shall be given a copy of their rights
"233
228. Gary Spencer, 'Post' Cleared Over Photo Suit, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6, 1993, at
1, 1-2; see also Siegel, supra note 174, at 1.
229. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 126, 612 N.E.2d at 705, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 356. Per-
haps, in the end, this is a determination for the trial court. Perhaps appellate
courts should not rule on whether conduct is "outrageous" and should leave that
determination for the trier of fact. See Halio v. Laurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d
759 (2d Dep't 1961); see also Richard L. v. Armon, 144 A.D.2d 1, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1014
(2d Dep't 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1977). The Restate-
ment provides:
It is for the Court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defend-
ant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as
to permit recovery or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men
may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine
whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme
and outrageous to result in liability.
Id.
230. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
231. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 33.05(a) (McKinney 1993); see also id. §§ 33.13,
33.16; see also 14 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 14, § 21.2 (1974) (further limi-
tations on visits).
232. N.Y. CoMN. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 374.14 (1993) (patients' rights).





Patients have the right to "[pirivacy while in the hospital
and confidentiality of all information and records regarding...
care."234 Patients also "have the right to receive clinically ap-
propriate care and treatment. . humanely administered with
full respect for their dignity and personal integrity"23 5 as well as
"a maximum amount of privacy."236 It is difficult to see how the
Howell court, by allowing a newspaper like the Post to publish
photographs of private psychiatric patients without consent and
against medical warning, has advanced the legislative intent to
insure patients privacy while in the hospital237 and treatment
"with full respect for their dignity and personal integrity."23 8
In New York, Public Health Law section 2083 expressly
commands that "[elvery patient shall have the right to have pri-
vacy in treatment. . . ."239 It is obvious that such privacy and
confidentiality is imperative, not only for proper treatment, but
for successful recovery from a psychiatric illness. The media
should not be allowed to circumvent State interests in affording
privacy to those seeking medical treatment. This is particularly
true with psychiatric patients.3
A review of a typical psychiatric hospital's policy regarding
patients' rights reveals an overwhelming concern for and en-
dorsement of the concepts of patient privacy and simple human
dignity.2 1 Specific provisions of a patients' rights policy would
include "considerate and respectful care in a clean and safe en-
vironment," "privacy consistent with the provisions of appropri-
ate care to the patient" and "confidentiality of all information
and records pertaining to the patient's treatment."242 Patients
are even to be apprised of the identity of any hospital person-
234. Id. § 405.7(13).
235. Id. § 587.7(7).
236. Id. § 587(10).
237. See id. § 405.7(b)(12).
238. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 587.7(7) (1993).
239. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-C(3)(f) (McKinney 1985).
240. MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482,446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (4th Dep't 1982);
see also Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 127 Misc. 2d 124, 425 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1985); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1944).
241. See generally Patients' Rights Policy, supra note 96.




ne1243 and again, most importantly, patients are to receive treat-
ment "with full respect for their dignity and personal
integrity.",244
Some psychiatric facilities even have a specific "media pol-
icy."24 5 When a person of "celebrity status" is admitted, appro-
priate hospital staff members are alerted and special
procedures are followed to insure institutional integrity, and
the integrity of the therapeutic environment. 246 These attempts
to contain a threat, a threat so obvious that "special procedures"
are necessary, can now be undermined with impunity relying
upon Howell as precedent.
New York State patients cannot wait for the media to com-
mit ever more outrageous conduct waiting for a court to act.
The New York State Legislature must pick up from where the
Court of Appeals has left off. Applying the reasoning behind the
decision in Howell, any patient in a similar facility would auto-
matically become "newsworthy" the moment a celebrity or other
newsworthy person is admitted to the same facility. Regardless
of medical warning or adverse impact, patients at such a facility
could find themselves on the front page of any tabloid simply for
being "at the scene of a newsworthy event."
Will patients, be they celebrities fearing no protection or
non-celebrities fearing the fallout, want to go to such facilities?
How will this liability impact upon the solvency of such facili-
ties? Shall hospitals become armed fortresses? Should patients
coping with illness be forced to sue their health care providers,
destroying relationships filled with the trust and compassion
upon which they depend, as their only recourse for conduct com-
mitted by a media entity?
Without some kind of intervention, the type of conduct
demonstrated by the Post will decrease access to care through
compromised treatment and chilled participation in psychiatric
and related facilities. At a minimum, the media should obtain
243. Id. at 3, 5. Patients have the right to know the identity of all hospital
staff but, according to Howell, unidentified tabloid reporters can nevertheless tres-
pass, photograph the patients without consent and publish those photos against
medical warning.
244. Id. at 5.





permission to be on the grounds of such a facility and written
informed consent to photograph and publish should be
mandatory. 247
V. Conclusion
The New York State Legislature has enacted various stat-
utes and regulations to help insure that psychiatric patients
can be treated in a safe, confidential and private environment
with respect for their dignity and personal integrity. Now, us-
ing Howell as precedent, these patient's rights can be violated
by the media when it deems fit and any physician's warning
against such harmful conduct will be of no moment.
While the Howell court did opine that on the right facts 2  a
claim for emotional distress may overcome the media's privi-
lege,249 this decision fails to adequately protect psychiatric pa-
tients. The Legislature must act to reaffirm and insure the
integrity of psychiatric patients' rights and all patients' rights
in New York State. The media must be required to obtain writ-
247. The Delan case is interesting to note on this specific point. Delan v. CBS,
91 A.D.2d 255, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1983). Ironically, it was even one of the
cases relied on by the Post. Respondent's Brief, supra note 140, at 23. In Delan
(solely a privacy case without any claim for infliction of emotional distress), a docu-
mentary was made about the care and treatment of patients in a mental institu-
tion. Delan, 91 A.D.2d at 256-58, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12. In that case, however,
the media had permission to be on the grounds of the institution. Id. at 257, 458
N.Y.S.2d at 612. The physicians from the institution and CBS personnel carefully
evaluated patients and explained the purpose of the proposed film prior to ob-
taining the involved patients' written informed consent. Id.
In Delan, the problem occurred when another patient, from whom consent was
not obtained, happened to be featured accidentally during a "fleeting" four seconds
of this sixty minute documentary. Id. at 256, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 611. The court held
that the film was of legitimate public interest, legitimately related to the plaintiff
and thus was a privileged subject. Id. at 259, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 613. As a result the
court reasoned that consent was not necessary. Id. at 261, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
In Howell, however, no attempt at such responsible reporting was made, and a
specific medical warning was ignored. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 118, 612 N.E.2d at
700, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 351. Furthermore, the publication of Mrs. Howell's photo-
graph on the front page was hardly a fleeting exposure. Hedda Talks, NEW YORK
POST, Sept. 2, 1988, at 1. Indeed, the photo is still available in archives to this day.
Notwithstanding, the attempts made by the media in Delan go a long way to
preventing the wrongs done in Howell and should be made mandatory when re-
porting on patients undergoing treatment. Since the Court of Appeals failed to
specifically make such law, the Legislature must create such protection by statute.
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ten informed consent to photograph and to publish, and must
not be allowed to use private psychiatric patients, or any pa-
tient, as interesting backdrop for tabloid news.
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/3
